



































Cyberspace has expanded the arena within which extremists and terrorists operate, posing a range of new challenges, many of which are still to be addressed.  From propaganda, through recruitment to financing and attack planning, the use of the Internet has been growing in size, subtlety and sophistication, often blurring the legal with the illegal.  Its interconnectivity, anonymity and affordability have served Muslim extremists, white supremacists and neo-Nazis alike.  The present article reviews the literature pertaining to the online challenges posed by such groups, pointing out how they might be potentially hampered by combining the currently dominant online surveillance with marginalized counter narrative messages.  The article also highlights the mechanisms of decision-making based on matters of principle and honour, the factors which typically drive terrorist actions, showing the inadequacy of the traditional economic models, on which the surveillance largely depends and risks scaring extremists off the radar.









Tackling Cyber-Terrorism: Balancing Surveillance with Counter Narratives
Drawing on the relatively sparse cyber-terrorism psychology literature, which might be partially down to the recentness of the phenomenon, this paper shall problematize the issue of tackling violent extremists online.​[1]​  Using selected theories and findings, it shall argue that much more attention should be paid to the power of cyberspace as a communication medium rather than just a surveillance tool.  In contrast to the traditional economic models (Simon, 1959; Becker, 1962), on which online surveillance and counter-terrorism in general still largely depend (Pape, 2005), it will be suggested that an alternative and under-utilized approach to challenging the extremist propaganda and networks lies in opening up multiple competing perspectives, viewpoints and alternative narratives.  To this end, and drawing on psychological research on decision making in the face of incomplete information, limited cognitive resources, and the biases to which the human mind often falls prey (Thaler 1990, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman 1974), (cyber) psychological research that takes online (video) debates, deceit and positive identity-affirming values into account will be subject to a comprehensive review. 
Despite contentious debates about the definition of terrorism (Cooper, 2001; Moghaddam, 2005), there is overall consensus that imparting messages through orchestrated violence is a central feature (Tsafi & Weimann, 2002).  Definitions of cyber-terrorism hold that such violence can be orchestrated from anywhere in the world with the use of a computer with a masked Internet Protocol (IP) address, thus changing the landscape of war itself (Beidleman, 2009).  The growing concerns about the interest in and use of the Internet by extremists and terrorists, who are more likely to be mentally healthy, calculating and intelligent rather than irrational or insane (Post, Ruby & Shaw, 2000),  made cyber-security a top priority on national, international, economic, and societal levels (Walker, 2012).  Analyses concerned with the threat of ‘cyber-terrorism’ have focused predominantly on how terrorist organisations might use Information Technology (IT) as a new weapon or target of mass destruction (Devost & Pollard, 2002; Hinde, 2001). 
The U. S. National Conference for State Legislatures defined ‘cyber-terrorism’ as ‘the use of information technology by terrorist groups and individuals to further their agenda.  This can include use of information technology to organize and execute attacks against networks, computer systems and telecommunications infrastructures, or for exchanging information or making threats electronically’ (NCSL, 2008).  Incorporating elements of traditional offline terrorism and technology, the term cyber-terrorism, which is often mistook by the mainstream  media for predominant cyber-crime, must not only involve invading private, government or military information systems, but must also be aimed at influencing the opinions of both the public and government by spreading terror (Rogers, 2008). 
Without doubt, the Internet and computer-mediated communications (CMCs) have revolutionized how people communicate and share information all over the world in ways that are as emotionally and personally involving as face-to-face (FTF) interactions (Derks, Fischer & Bos, 2008).  Even before the recent Arab Spring, the connection between information technology and cultural transformation in the Middle East was clearly recognized (Bailey & Grimaila, 2006).  Today, financial institutions, private industry, and governments have come to rely on such technology to manage sensitive data and critical infrastructure, inevitably exposing themselves to the threat posed by cybercriminals, extremist groups and terrorist organizations (Holt, 2012; Post et al., 2000).  This opens up an important debate about the optimal balance between the currently dominant defence strategies focused on online surveillance, which are supposed to aid user identification, and the less popular strategies focused on online communication, which are aimed at limiting the impact of terrorist propaganda and networking in cyberspace. 
Cyberspace – the expanding arena for terrorists
 Lacking physical limits or boundaries, the arrival of the Internet has created an unprecedented venue for disaffected individuals to meet together, share their views and reinforce prejudices (Weimann, 2008), making it more likely for future wars to be waged between transnational groups and states rather than between states and states (Van Creveld, 1997; Uda, 2012).  The rapidly increasing number of extremist websites portraying the perceived injustice committed against Muslim communities, for example, legitimise the post 9/11 movement and serve as inspiration for stoking radical sentiments, glorifying acts of martyrdom against (the Western) infidels (Hui, 2010).  The cyber-fatwas posted on such websites that openly promote terrorist acts (Weiman, 2011) only make the matter worse.  The number of websites associated with Al Qaeda increased from 12 in 1998 to more than 2600 by 2006 (Jacobson, 2010).  Featuring information on military skills and tactics, as well as bomb-making, firearms and hacking manuals, such (often password-protected) websites have been fuelling the electronic jihad (Hui, 2010).  Using euphemistic language and distorting sequences of events, users of these online spaces seek to displace responsibility (a ‘natural’ response arising from situational pressure), diffuse responsibility (e.g. the out-group must be to blame), dehumanise victims, attribute blame (i.e. perpetrators view themselves as provoked victims) and use advantageous comparisons (e.g. comparing a successful symbolic attack to the attacks by a well-equipped army) to justify their deeds.  
Even though the Internet is not a ‘virtual training camp’ (Stenersen, 2008), it serves as a resource bank that allows militants to share substantial technical knowledge, along with religious, political and ideological information​[2]​ (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Kenney, 2010; Soriano, 2012; Kennedy & Weimann, 2011).  For example, former Al Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah operative Imam Samudra, who was convicted for his role in the 2002 Bali bombings, openly encouraged his followers to hack and exploit the vulnerabilities of U. S. computer networks to aid credit card fraud and money laundering (Jacobson, 2010).  Although, providing one’s current location as being in a different country became common practice on forums, blogs, and even non-extremist radical websites (Hui, 2010), terrorists seem to be so confident about their own Internet security that many of their websites are openly hosted by companies in the United States (Jacobson, 2010).  
 The Internet also enabled the Far Right to cross national and geographical boundaries and circumvent the laws banning hate material in the UK, US, France, Germany, and Scandinavia (Whine, 2011).  Thus, new information and communication technologies (ICTs) open up innovative operational vistas for extremists and terrorists alike, affording them opportunities to communicate, and develop a sense of common purpose by combining both intimacy and remoteness (Back, Keith & Solomos, 1998).  Given the perception of the mass media as having been dominated by Western propaganda, the radical websites, for example, explain their mission in terms of correcting such propaganda and revealing the true picture (Hui, 2010).  Allowing for the diffusion of command and control, which the Far Right have long been proponents of,​[3]​  ICTs provide unprecedented benefits: interconnectivity, anonymity, cheapness, power enhancement and new audiences (Whine, 1999), which are clarified in the following paragraph. 
To begin, some of the first groups to seize upon interconnectivity were Neo-Nazis communicating with one another and organizing their activities through online social networks in the 1980’s (Levin, 2002).  Second, given that terrorist collaboration is inherently risky and a prime target for national security services, the digital nature of cyberspace has been serving as a very effective tool for covert communication that does not need any central headquarters (Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg, 1997).  For example, the Nationalist Socialist Movement and Combat 18 used this kind of anonymity to register their sites in North America (Ashcroft, 1998).  Anonymity can also be used within the group itself, creating segmentation that allows individuals to operate separately, yet still on a group-level, hampering infiltration agencies that can extract only limited information from captured members (Rogers, 2008).  Third, the affordability of ICTs in inflicting terror was demonstrated by the organizers of Iraqi suicide bombing squads who relied on cheap laptops and remote-signal detonators (Urban, 2010).  Fourth, ICTs give continuous voice to some of the most isolated extremists who are eventually marginalized by the mainstream media that are often too slow to realize the deleterious effects their spotlight can cause, see for example  coverage of  Terry Jones, the Christian pastor and the 2012 self-declared independent US presidential candidate (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​United_States_third_party_and_independent_presidential_candidates,_2012​) who achieved much coverage following his announcement that he woul  ‘burn-the Quaran’.   Fifth, ICTs enable such extremists to reach both their target and new audiences, which might be exemplified by the invitation that the aforementioned pastor received from the English Defence League in 2010.
Not surprisingly, several suggestions have been made to curb the influence of terrorists in the mainstream media, limiting and censoring their news coverage being some of the most popular measures (Tsafi & Weimann, 2002).  Such measures, however, have been largely unsuccessful in computer-mediated communication (CMC), its main features being relative anonymity (compared to face-to-face communication), physical isolation, limited identifiability (messengers are less traceable) and lack of censorship and regulation (facing fewer legal constraints, messengers can become less inhibited and bolder.  How can such features facilitate the social influence that terrorists can exert?  Despite physical isolation, terrorist groups can still use virtual membership, which similar to the research on offline group membership (Pynchon & Borum, 1999), tends to lead to group polarization and group think (Gui-xia, 2005).  Both of these psychological processes lead to group opinions and attitudes becoming more extreme than the initial inclinations of individual members, potentially affecting the group’s ability to make rational decisions.  Similar features of group membership have historically been shown to lead to out-group derogation, facilitating violent acts in real-life (Dutton, 2007; Zimbardo, 2008).  Given that offline group membership dynamics can be applied to virtual memberships (Postmes, Spears & Lea, 1999) this suggests a close relationship between in-group dynamics of traditional terrorist groups and terrorist groups that use the internet.
Anonymity, which broadens the scope of cyber-terrorist attacks (Rogers, 2008) along with physical isolation, were found to reduce interpersonal influence by increasing the focus on personal needs and private self-awareness (Sassenberg, Boss & Rabung, 2005; Spears, Postmes, Lea & Watt, 2001).  When it comes to status differences within the interaction group, it appears that those seen as experts in terms of task-relevant knowledge (e.g., hacking) are indeed more persuasive (Sassenberg & Jonas, 2007).  It also seems that the more there is a match between the communication style and the target of a message, the higher level of interpersonal influence will occur (Sassenberg & Jonas, 2007).  Accordingly, it has been argued that, in contrast to women, men, who dominate terrorist ranks, are more influenced in CMC than in face-to-face communication probably because communication via CMC has a more independent (rather than ‘cooperative’) style (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2002).  Such research on CMC features has also played a significant role in attempts to spot cyber-terrorist deception. 
Digital deception
The susceptibility of charities and non-governmental organizations to terrorist exploitation has been partially attributed to the easily adaptable guise of supporting relief, religious, educational and scientific purposes, as well as to obscuring or concealing the links with organizations promoting political violence (Jacobson, 2010).  Given the intertwinement of communicative aspects of terrorism and message misrepresentation in cyberspace, attention should hence be paid to digital deception  ‘…intentional control of information in a technologically mediated message to create false belief in the receiver of the message’ (Hancock, 2007; p. 290).  Apart from potentially inciting panic and hatred, such deception an also involve financial fraud (Jacobson, 2010).  According to Corera (2008), the Al Qaeda-affiliated and online-operating Jemmah Islamiyah, for example, used jewel store robberies to finance the 2002 Bali bombings and  the cell that carried out the 2004 Madrid train bombing partially funded its operation by selling hashish and conducting some of its transactions online.  The group that executed the 2005 attacks on the London transportation system was co-funded by credit card fraud (Corera, 2008). 
 Even individual actors, however, appear capable of playing a major role, the self-proclaimed 007, Younis Tsouli, being just one example.  Having launched his career by distributing terrorist video material and posting instructional material online, including tutorials on making suicide bomb vests and other explosive devices, he acquired stolen credit card numbers on online forums and laundered his funds through online gambling sites to become the world’s most wanted cyber-jihadist. Following the governmental crackdown on cyber-terrorism across the globe, the extremists taking advantage of the relative security and anonymity that the Internet offers began to be more aware of the risks of getting caught and began to rely more frequently on fake names, encryption and Internet cafes that in most countries do not require identification (Jacobson, 2010).  The limited practicality of the current digital deception detection models (Zimbler & Feldman, 2011; Whitty, Buchanan, Joinson & Meredith, 2012) invites a debate about complementing the online surveillance with counter narrative messages that would tap into the values that terrorists often embrace. 
Economic models vs. sacred values
Apart from deceiving each other and their potential followers, could extremists and those trying to hamper them deceive themselves?  Both policymakers (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) and researchers (Pape, 2005) typically assume that terrorist warfare decisions are based on rational cost-benefit calculations (Ginges, 1997), which is reflected in the general patterns of Internet surveillance (Brown & Korff, 2009).  The ‘psychology out of the laboratory’ (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva & Medlin, 2011, p. 507), however, suggests otherwise.  When Iran was ruled by the opposition-crushing Shah, US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, strongly supported the Iranian pursuit of nuclear energy, which is now argued to have been a cover for its nuclear weapons program.  Before Saddam Hussein ‘earned’ the label of an evil tyrant, he was considered by the George Bush I administration an ally to be reasoned with and supplied with weapons of mass destruction despite his brutal crackdown on the Shiite rebellion (Chomsky, 2006).  Regardless of Muammar Gaddafi’s involvement in global acts of terrorism, he was warmly received at the headquarters of the European Union (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​European_Union​) (EU) in Brussels (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Brussels​) and paid to put a stop to African migrants passing through the Lybian borders and into Europe.  Thus, he became a reasonable partner after he renounced the possession of chemical (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Weapon_of_mass_destruction​) weapons only to try to use them against his own countrymen during the Lybian civil war (Waterfield, 2011).  Today, North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, is considered too reasonable to jeopardize his cozy lifestyle by attacking any country even though he openly calls for the advancement of his nuclear-armed country's long-range rocket programme (​http:​/​​/​i.trkjmp.com​/​click?v=R0I6MTQxNjI6Njpwcm9ncmFtbWU6ZjE2N2JkNTIxZDkxZmQ4ZjhiMmZhOTkwNWFjOWI5Y2U6ei0xMTIyLTYyODYyOnd3dy5pbmRlcGVuZGVudC5jby51azoxMjQ3MTo5NzZmNTQ2MDM0MWVjMWVkNDJiYmU4MjQ0NzNiYWY5MA​) (Williams, 2012). 
As group-level moral obligations reinforce cooperative norms by endowing them with sacredness (Ginges et al., 2011) they incline individuals to sacrifice their own self-interest (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004).  The limited adequacy of rational choice theories was demonstrated in politics (Schelling, 1993), economics (Kahneman, 2003) and everyday life (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), supporting the growing research indicating people’s limited ability to carry out accurate cost-benefit-analyses (Ariely, 2008; Bennis, Medin & Bartels, 2010) and providing the ground for non-rational theories.  Following a rule-bound logic of absolutist thinking and moral appropriateness, sacred values show insensitivity to gain-loss quantification (Atran, 2010; Tanner & Medin, 2004).  Being tightly intertwined with sentiments of personal and collective identity (Dehghani et al., 2010), these values are primarily driven by emotions (Ginges & Atran, 2011).  Extrapolating from this, one can argue that it would have been un-American to simply follow Saddam Hussein’s request for $1 billion and asylum just before the invasion of Iraq (Washington, 2007) now estimated to cost approximately $1 trillion (Brown University, 2012).  Thus, it appears that relying on businesslike negotiations can easily backfire if material gains are interpreted as principle-infringing, identity-defying and insulting (Ginges et al., 2011), suggesting that rationality-based cyber appeals for moderation are likely to fall on deaf ears unless they are bound-up with identity-affirming sentiments.  
Awareness of the importance of ‘narratives’ to terrorist movements, particularly in the construction and promotion of ideologies that promote and sustain terrorism and extremism, highlight the importance of thinking about providing ‘alternatives’ that might be able to effectively influence and/or engage target audiences.  Lessons learned from previous research indicate that governments are the least viable source from which to launch such alternatives (deGraaf, 2009; Jacobson, 2009) and Casebeer and Russell (2005) suggest that success in producing effective alternative narratives lies in knowing the target audience, making narratives appropriate to the environment, evaluating storylines and ensuring the potential to control the flow and message of the narrative over time (and in the face of a changing conflict).  Additionally, they highlight factors relating to interaction between opposing narratives, acknowledgement of differences between long and short term goals, creating narratives that are resilient and ensuring fluidity and adaptability within narrative structures.  
Identifying Terrorists
Although the PATRIOT Act, which was signed into law by President George W. Bush in response to the September 11 attacks equipped the US government with the powers to search various communications such as email, telephone records and medical records (Bullock, Haddow, Coppola, & Yeletaysi, 2009), its impact is still debatable, controversial and divisive.  Attempts to identify a common psychological profile of a terrorist have also been largely unsuccessful (Hoffman, 1999; Horgan, 2005). This might be exemplified by the Boston Marathon bombers and the Woolwich attackers, who had been respectively known to the FBI (Pilkington & Elder, 2013) and MI5 (Glover, et al., 2013), putting the current over-reliance on online surveillance in question.  Varying in ideology, motivation and personality, terrorists come from a range of backgrounds and become involved in terrorist movements for diverse reasons (Horgan, 2005).
Even though suicide bombers’ motivations are sometimes attributed to their religious faith (Dawkins, 2006), none of the 9/11 plane bombers or Madrid train bombers, and only one of the London Underground bombers, attended religious schools (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva & Medin, 2011), supporting the analysis that terrorist groups rarely draw from them and that religious motivation and poverty are poor predictors of violent involvement (Atran, 2010).  However, factors like social networks (Sageman, 2008) perceived foreign meddling (Pape, 2005), hardship under occupation (Pape & Feldman, 2010), a sense of national humiliation (Merari, 2010), and frustrated expectations (Ginges et al., 2011; Spaij, 2012) are far more significant.  As all these factors can be easily found in the backgrounds of  non-violent individuals, there is doubt over their usefulness in online surveillance.  Just as it has already been the case with senior Al Qaeda operatives (Bowden, 2012), the over-reliance on such surveillance alone is only likely to drive more and more extremists offline and off the radar, and yet fail to stop them from using the power of the Internet.
Directions for cyber-counter-terrorism 
	Although cyberspace can facilitate ‘traditional’ terrorist attacks (Jacobson, 2010; Hui, 2010; Tsfati & Wemann; Whine, 1999), it also allows for its reduction and prevention (Amble, 2012; Lyon, 2003), albeit not with online surveillance alone.  Despite the increasing capacity of the Internet for surveillance and user identification, which also challenges the privacy and non-discrimination rights, posing challenges for democracy, the rule of law and cross-border cooperation (Brown & Korff, 2009; Wagner, 2007), it appears that cyber-terrorist attacks will become extremely effective and even more difficult to trace back to the source (Rogers, 2008).  Thus, it is argued, much more attention should be paid to the power of the Internet as a communication medium rather than just a surveillance tool.  
A way to effectively communicate alternative ideologies/narratives might be symbolically illustrated by the theoretical framework of the terrorism staircase (Moghaddam, 2005), featuring increasing and narrowing floors representing degrees of involvement in the terrorist movement, with fewer and fewer exit options as the floors increase.  Finally, the only way out for the individual appears to be ‘provoked’ violence.  When living conditions on the most spacious and populous ground floor appear unjust and hopeless to those who are inclined to extremism, practical messages about how to improve their quality of life just a bit might be posted on popular Internet forums in the native languages and local dialects.  Even before few radicalised or confused individuals begin to climb the metaphorical stairs, it is vital to warn against the categorical us-versus-them thinking and strategies of deceit and propaganda employed by extremist leaders.  
When the few start climbing it, efforts should be made to enter into dialogue with them, pointing out alternative options that tap into their cherished principles rather than simple material trade-offs, which might be facilitated by online social networking sites and positive identity-affirming websites.  For example, Jacobson (2009) recommends aiming various narratives at the different roles that terrorist group members hold within an organisation, ranging from the creators/consumers of web material to the bomb-makers and recruiters. Similarly, it is worth considering the stage or level of involvement of the individual (i.e. supporter/recruit/active member) and whether different forms of narrative should be aimed at these different audiences​[4]​. This process, which also finds support in the theory of informational noise reduction (Weimann & Von Knop, 2008), is likely to dilute (but not eliminate) extremist voices by offering alternative perspectives.  
On the one hand, informational source credibility and argument quality impact on social influence (Li, 2013), which might give the self-proclaimed true servants of the nation, justice or God the upper hand in bringing like-minded fanatics into their fold.  On the other hand, however, the multiple source effect (Harkins & Petty, 1981), whereby people give more credence to ideas stated by multiple sources, can serve as an opposing force that is unlikely to be completely overridden.   Just as there is emerging evidence that responsive communications can reduce extremists’ chances of radicalising others, spreading fear and mounting successful operations (Fischoff, 2011), so is there a huge potential for counteracting radicals online (Soriano, 2012), the argument being that this process can be facilitated by utilizing cyberspace as a communication medium rather than just as a surveillance tool.  Counter-terrorism experts, who are beginning to post ‘counter-narrative’ messages and who are assisted by former radicals challenging  the extremist rhetoric on online forums (Cahalan & Owen, 2013), would benefit from the insights that psychology can offer.  This might be illustrated by presenting religious and political violence as harmful to the interests of the ingroup or extending the boundaries of social togetherness to the (enemy) out-group. 
 For example, following self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher &Wetherell, 1987), which proposes that social categories are fluid and subject to contextualised change, it has been demonstrated, in violent virtual settings, that recategorizing a former out-group as part of the in-group resulted in more cyber-bystander intervention (Slater et al., 2013).  More specifically, levels of perceived ‘out-groupness’ could be minimized with ingroup-inducing verbal primes to stimulate the online involvement of witnesses to physical assault, drawing parallels with similar research on mobilizing chatroom strangers to respond to sexual abuse, which online surveillance actually hampered (Palasinski, 2012).  Lending support to the power of cyberspace as a communication medium for out-group recategorization, it was thus proposed that even appearances of online surveillance could erode social bonds, diffuse personal responsibility and diminish the sense of making a difference. 
Conclusions
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^1	   For the practical purposes of this work, the action-connoting term ‘terrorist’ and intention-connoting term ‘violent extremist’ will be used interchangeably.
^2	  Examples abound including, Arid Uka, who shot dead two US airmen at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011, and who claimed to have been radicalised by Jihadist propaganda videos online. Colleen Renee LaRose (also known as JihadJane and Fatima LaRose), is an American citizen charged with terrorism-related crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder and providing material support to terrorists. Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, 31, was detained in Ireland in connection with an alleged conspiracy to kill a Swedish cartoonist.  And most recently, Anders Behring Breivik carefully prepared an Internet-based media strategy to accompany his attacks in July 2011. 
^3	  See for example the essays of Louis Beam on the concept of  ‘leaderless resistance’, a philosophy whereby individual and autonomous activity is encouraged.
^4	  In much the same way as Cordes (1988) discusses propaganda and auto-propaganda, with auto-propaganda aimed internally, at those involved in the movement.
